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ABSTRACT

The last decade and a half has witnessed a dramatic growth in mining activity in many
developing countries. This paper reviews these recent trends and describes the
debates and conflicts they have triggered. We review evidence regarding debates on
the resource curse and the possibility of an extraction led pathway to development.
We then describe the different types of resistance and social mobilization that have
greeted mineral expansion at a range of geographical scales, and consider how far
these protests have changed the relationships between mining and political economic
change. The conclusions address how far such protest might contribute to an
“escape” from the resource curse, and consider implications for research and policy
agendas.

This paper has been made possible by an Economic and Social Research Council Professorial Research
Fellowship to Bebbington (Grant Number RES051-27-0191) supporting the programme on Territories,
Conflicts and Development in the Andes (http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes/), a
collaboration between Manchester and the Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales (www.cepes.org.pe).
It also draws on ESRC-DfID supported research on social movements and poverty (Grant Number RES
167-25-0170). Many thanks to our two reviewers, Gavin Bridge, Stuart Kirsch, Bridget O’Laughlin
and Tom Perreault for very helpful comments and guidance.
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Contentious and ambiguous: two words to describe the relationship between large
scale mining and development. “Contentious” because mining has so often delivered
adverse social, environment and economic effects for the many, but only significant
gains for the few; ambiguous because of the abiding sense, among local populations
as much as development professionals, that just maybe mining could contribute much
more. In the coexistence of such divergent feelings about mining and its human and
environmental impacts lie the seeds of much conflict. In this paper we explore these
contested arguments about the implications of mining for development, explain why
the existence of so much conflict around mining should not be a surprise, and suggest
that, notwithstanding nuanced conceptual arguments about the potential benefits of
mining, there are many reasons to expect that it will continue to trigger protest.

To the professional, westernized and activist eye, it might seem obvious that large
scale mining is bad for human development. Mines have been associated with
appalling labour conditions and, in the southern African case, whole regional
economies organized around political and territorializing instruments designed to keep
labour cheap and controllable. Mining has also been associated with palpably
unsustainable patterns of development and growth. The examples are legion: Potosí,
Bolivia - once comparable in size to London and a hive of extractive activity, now the
poor capital of a chronically impoverished department, ironically now undergoing
another mining boom; Appalachia – geologically wealthy yet one of the US’s poorest
regions; the first author’s own Stoke-on-Trent, a one-time mining-pottery-iron and
steel complex that he watched unravel and hollow out during his teenage years; and
La Oroya, a Peruvian smelter town at the nodal point in a regional economy of
mining, declared by the Blacksmith Institute as one of the ten most polluted places in
the world (Blacksmith Institute, 2007; BBC, 2006). Air pollutants are so concentrated
in La Oroya that children are bussed out of town during the day so they don’t have to
breathe within the city limits (O’Shaughnessy, 2007).

Mining has also been associated with spectacularly unequal distributions of wealth.
While children and young adults die prematurely in La Oroya, in New York’s
exclusive Hamptons the smelter’s owner has built himself what would, according to
some, be the most expensive house in the world were it ever to go on the market
(Shnayerson, 2003). In earlier historical periods, Bolivian tin barons accumulated
2

fortunes that were built into national and international cityscapes, while the labour
reserve economy underpinning Southern African mining subsidized accumulation
controlled and permitted by the apartheid economy. Meanwhile mining has been the
backdrop for sad, sometimes tragic music – from Hugh Masakela’s “Stimela (Coal
Train)” of Southern Africa to solemn huaynos from the central Andes of Peru.

Yet the arguments are never as simple as suggested by the emblematic examples.
Indeed, within several of the cases just noted lie seeds of complication. For even if
the mining sector left so little behind in British regional economies, mine workers
fought to the bitter end to defend the industry and the regional cultures it had
sustained. In Bolivia, mine workers’ unions were among the most potent sources for
progressive political change in the twentieth century. Even in La Oroya, as smelters
contaminate children’s blood and teenager cancer rates chill the observer’s, much of
the population defends the continued existence of the smelter and of the regional
mining economy with which it is symbiotically linked. Such defence of the self-same
industry that scars both landscapes and lungs is found throughout time and across
space. The pacts between populations and the mining economy seem, then, Faustian
in the extreme. But pacts they are, and benefits do flow in both directions, even if
unevenly so. As June Nash (1979) so perceptively titled her classic study of mining
cultures and political economies in highland Bolivia: “We eat the mines and the mines
eat us.”

The ambivalence towards mining so often encountered in popular culture finds similar
expression in academic and policy writing. Conflicting views have always been on
offer and even if, as Rosser (2008) argues, “Prior to the 1980s, natural resources
wealth was widely seen as a blessing for developing countries”, analytical voices did
not speak as one. The Economic Commission for Latin America (among others)
argued that economies would be constrained by deteriorating terms of trade if they
continued in their dependence on the export of primary products. More recently,
advocates of the “resource curse thesis” express similar concerns about the adverse
effects of mineral dependence on growth and equity (Auty, 1993, Sachs and Warner,
1995; Ross, 2008). Even authors who see possibilities of “escaping the resource
curse” suggest that if institutional conditions are not right, then minerals should be left
in the ground (Stiglitz, 2007).
3

Yet the World Bank Group and other international financial institutions (IFIs) have
continued to encourage countries to commit to extractive industry growth as a
development strategy (Campbell, 2008). Since the 1990s, over ninety countries have
rewritten mining and investment codes (Bridge, 2004a). The industry has responded
accordingly, and many developing countries – both with and without a tradition of
mining - have seen significant increases in investment. This expansion has been
accompanied by social conflict and political debates around the relations among
mining, human rights, environmental integrity, and development. Such debates occur
not only among activists, specialist organizations and the industry. They have also
been the stuff of presidential campaigns (e.g. Peru, 2006), constitutional reform
(Ecuador, 2008) and efforts to craft an ostensibly post-neo-liberal model of
development (e.g. Bolivia).

Mineral expansion opens up theoretically urgent questions about neoliberalization,
democracy and the state as well as the relationships between social movements and
political economy. In this paper we first discuss ways in which these themes have
been handled within literatures addressing the “resource curse” and socio-political
dynamics in mineral economies. We then discuss the parts played by different actors
within these relationships, with a particular focus first on international financial
institutions and the industry, and second on social movements and activist
organizations and networks. The conflicts among these different actors reflect the
contentiousness and ambiguity of mining’s relationship to development and
democracy. These very same conflicts, however, might well constitute the political
pathway towards the construction of institutions that could foster more socioeconomically inclusive and less environmentally damaging forms of mineral
expansion.

CURSES, CONFLICTS, CONTAMINATIONS: DEBATING THE “PARADOX
OF PLENTY”2

2

The title of Terry Karl’s classic on the resource curse (Karl, 1997).
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Much social science production on mining has been dominated by debates over the
“resource curse,” a thesis that gained momentum in the early 1990s in an attempt to
explain two decades of poor economic performance in mineral-rich countries (Auty,
1993, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 1995). The thesis suggests that natural resource
abundance generates a series of economic and political distortions which ultimately
undermine the contributions of extractive industry to development. A parallel and
related literature has drawn attention to environmental and community level “curses”
that also accompany mineral expansion.3 These literatures have not gone uncontested.
Some authors have questioned the existence of a resource curse (Davis, 1995), and
others challenge the methodologies and indicators that have been used to demonstrate
it (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008), or argue that if mining has been associated with
poor economic and political performance this has been due to pre-existing political
institutions rather than mining per se (Davis and Tilton, 2002; Humphreys et al.,
2007). In this section we review several ways in which this literature has associated
mining with development. While there are apparent points of convergence in these
debates, this convergence remains more intellectual than practical.

Mining, growth and poverty

At the centre of the resource curse debate is the argument that mining is associated
with poor growth performance (Auty, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Weber-Fahr,
2002; Freudenburg and Wilson, 2002). Several reasons are suggested for this. One is
the idea of a “Dutch disease” in which mineral wealth leads to levels of consumption
and investment during boom periods that cannot be sustained through subsequent
downswings. This brings exchange rate and wage effects that cripple the growth of
non-mineral tradable sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing, leading to an
economic structure dominated by enclave economies linked to resource extraction.
Such effects are commonly observed in mineral dependent economies (Mikesell
1997), though it is likely the case that the extractive sector is not the only factor
3

Much of this writing has been produced by activist organizations and exists as grey literature,
electronic documents and websites. Indeed, except as regards debates on mining and macroeconomic
and political issues, the activist community has been well ahead of the scholarly community. Important
websites include: Earthworks, http://www.earthworksaction.org/; Mines and Communities,
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/; No Dirty Gold, http://www.nodirtygold.org/; Observatory for
Mining Conflicts in Latin America, http://www.conflictosmineros.net/al/html/index.php; and Oxfam
America, http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/issues_we_work_on/oil_gas_mining/.
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limiting diversification. Indeed, the introduction of new institutional frameworks
favouring a concentration of investment in mining have themselves often been
products of broader sets of neoliberalizing policy changes, in contexts as diverse as
Central Asia (Clark and Naito, 1998) and the Andes (Bebbington, 2007).

The concentration of activity in one sector of the economy brings with it
vulnerabilities associated with export dependence. Vulnerability arises from mineral
price volatility, and dependence is reinforced by those upstream economic actors that
control processing and marketing of final products derived from the minerals in
question. Moreover, mining complexes often take the form of enclave economies,
developing relatively few links to local suppliers (to the point where many modern
transnationally owned mines bring in food from the capital or overseas through
contracts with international catering companies: eg. Szablowski, 2002: 263). As a
consequence the multiplier effects in the local and regional economy are weak.
Closely related to these observations on growth is the claim that “mining has a dismal
track record to date in poverty reduction” (Pegg, 2006:376). Freudenburg and Wilson
(2002) draw similar conclusions from a meta-review of 301 sets of findings on mining
and economic development in the USA. These “dismal” effects on poverty are
explained in several ways. One interpretation departs from the position that mining is
bad for growth: “If growth is good for the poor, oil and minerals exports are bad for
growth – and hence, bad for the poor” writes political scientist Michael Ross in an
influential report for OxfamAmerica (Ross, 2001: 9). A second route is through the
wider political economy effects of mineral growth. Some argue that the availability
of mineral wealth discourages investment to increase labour productivity in nonmineral sectors leading to underinvestment in education (Pegg, 2006) - though Stijns
(2006) argues that with different indicators mineral wealth is associated with greater
investment in education. A third position (assumed by the industry) insists that
mining is good for growth but still acknowledges that poverty impacts have been
disappointing because of poor government capacity and broader governance issues
(ICMM, 2006).

Mineral dependence, governance and conflict
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Alongside these effects on economic structure, it is also argued that the concentration
of economic activity in one sector elicits socio-political and institutional relationships
that undermine sustainable and inclusive development. Sectoral concentration implies
a concentration of ownership and of power - often in foreign hands – which reduces
political competition in policy making and institutional design, increasing the
potential for capture and bias. Concentration also leads to revenue streams that are
large and easily identifiable, triggering struggles over their control. Mineral rents can
also feed the over-expansion of bureaucracy, and induce patronage, clientelism and
graft that corrode the quality of government (Auty, 2008; Auty and Gelb, 2001).

The main negative relationship between good governance and mineral wealth relates
to lack of transparency and corruption in the appropriation and use of state revenue.
There is ample documentation of political corruption involving the allocation of
resources to favoured constituents who, in turn, favour the politicians currently in
power. Meanwhile, government revenue from extractive industries can undermine
broader based taxation systems that play a vital role in establishing a broad “fiscal
social contract” that ties together citizens and governors and gives citizens certain
authority to hold government to account (Karl, 2007). Absent such a system, the
possibilities for unchecked corruption and poor use of public resources are far greater.
The more general point here is that, if “state authority is historically constructed
through a series of exchange of resources for institutions” (Karl, 2007: 259), then in
mineral dependent states these exchanges are not between state and citizenry but
rather between the state and those corporations, foreign powers and financial
institutions whose activities generate resources for the state. These exchanges deliver
institutional arrangements designed to attend to the needs and demands of these latter
actors rather than citizens, and thus lead to an extroverted state with more legitimacy
vis-à-vis international interests than national citizens.

This is one of the reasons why natural resource wealth has been identified as a major
cause of armed civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Ross, 2008; for dissenting
views see De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007). Over the last decade much of this
literature (combining the cases of both hydrocarbon and mining dependent
economies) has discussed whether such conflict should be understood in terms of
7

political and ideological “grievance” among those who bear the costs of extraction
and see resource wealth being extracted from their territories, or rather as a
consequence of strategic forms of “greed” in which revenues from natural resources
motivate looting or extortion from mining companies and provide opportunity for
financing large-scale violence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 2005). As Holden and
Jacobson (2007) show in the Philippines, both effects can operate at the same time:
they give evidence suggesting that mining fosters both grievance and extortion driven
conflict, at the same time as it both deepens conflicts (through the militarization that
accompanies mining expansion) and delays their resolution (because the Philippine
government did not want a peace deal that would cede resource rich areas to a Muslim
government).

Of course, not all conflict around extractive industry leads to armed civil strife. Many
conflicts are instead socio-environmental struggles over the control of space, the
governance of territory, access to land and water resources, the defence of human and
citizenship rights, and dissatisfaction over the distribution of mineral rents (see
chapters in Peluso and Watts, 2001; Bebbington, 2007). Rather than view such
conflicts as always and necessarily a problem, and an indicator of development gone
wrong, it is also possible to see them as potentially creative. Indeed, analogies might
be drawn with historical experiences in which conflict has been associated with the
emergence of more inclusive public institutions that – were it not for the conflict –
would never have been created.

Expansion of large scale mining can also foster conflicts among different types of
mining and miner. At times artisanal and small-scale mining can be found in the
same areas as large scale mining, and not infrequently central ministries grant
concessions to companies in areas already occupied by artisanal miners. Hilson and
Yakovelva (2007) have documented such conflicts in Ghana, we have encountered
them in south-eastern Ecuador and Bolivia, and they also have been noted in PNG,
Indonesia, Suriname and Guyana.4

Mining and the environment

4

On artisanal mining see, for instance, Hilson and Yakovelva (2007) and Fisher (2007).

8

If in the face of such analyses it has been difficult for the mining sector to argue that it
can be good for growth and governance, arguing its case on environmental grounds is
even more of a challenge. At a global level, figures collected by advocacy groups
suggest significant environmental impact, and others note that “the discovery,
extraction and processing of mineral resources is widely regarded as one of the most
environmentally and socially disruptive activities undertaken by business” (Jenkins
and Yakovleva, 2006: 272). According to Cardiff and Sampat (2007), while mining
contributes around 1 percent of global GDP, it consumes between 7 and 10 percent of
global energy and is responsible for 13 percent of sulphur dioxide emissions. Some
39 percent of threatened forest margins are also threatened because of mining
activities. In one extreme case, a glacier filled valley on the Chile-Argentina border is
the site of a major mining conflict.5

On a more local scale, mineralizations are often found in headwater areas that serve as
sources for rural and urban water supply, or in desert areas where water required for
extraction and processing has to be diverted from elsewhere and other uses. With
open pit technologies the local and regional landscape transformations associated with
mining become all the more significant. Though an extreme case, the surface area of
Minera Yanacocha’s6 open pit gold mine in the department of Cajamarca, Peru,
exceeds that of the departmental capital city and is visible from outer space (Bury,
2005). Meanwhile, modern mines require immense quantities of energy in order to
operate and mine development is often accompanied with construction of dams and
hydroelectric plants, or the extension of natural gas based energy networks – all
introducing further competition over land, water and energy resources between mines
and other users.

These and other environmental impacts have led to green accounting initiatives that
seek to give a fuller calculation of the final economic benefits of mining. Thus in
Chile, one of the banner countries for the “mining leads to development” argument,
5

This is the proposed Pascua Lama mine that Canadian company Barrick Gold Corporation hope to
develop.
6
Minera Yanacocha is owned by Newmont, Buenaventura and the International Finance Corporation.
Unlike conventional mining that enters by shafts to access underground veins, open pit mining involves
opening the land from the surface, the removal of vast quantities of earth and rock, and extensive land
cover change –Yanacocha moved around 200 million tons of rock p.a. (2003-2005).

9

conventional accounting measures suggest that mining contributed between 7 and 9
percent of the country’s GDP during the first half of the 1990s. However,
environmental economists from the University of Chile and Chile’s National
Commission for the Environment concluded that traditional accounting methods
“overestimated the economic income generated by the Chilean mining sector…by 20–
40 percent” (Figueroa et al, 2007: 215), even when only factoring in the costs of
resource depletion. Had additional environmental and health effects of mining, such
as air or water pollution, also been included then the overestimation would have been
greater still.

Convergences, divergences

Existing at the interface of academics and activism, the debate on mining, extraction
and development has generated its fair share of catchy terms: “resource curse,”
“Dutch disease,” “greed and grievance.” Indeed, it is perhaps because of their
potential political resonance that these terms have been challenged. Thus while some
speak of “the well-documented ‘resource curse’” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005: 625)
others argue that the evidence for the curse is largely an artefact of indicator choice
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). For its part, the industry seeks to reframe the
debate in terms of the “resource endowment” rather than “curse” (ICMM, 2006).

As these debates have unfolded there appears to have been convergence among the
views of critics and boosters. Auty seems to see more scope for escaping the curse
(1993; 2001; 2008), while Pegg (2006:377) “accepts the fact that mining is potentially
a great source of wealth which could generate tremendous economic benefits for poor
countries” (our emphasis). Meanwhile among the proponents of mining, the World
Bank publishes material suggesting “that countries with substantial incomes from
mining performed less well than countries with less income from mining” (FahrWeber, 2002: 7).7 Authors who have criticized the idea of the resource curse now
conclude that perhaps mining ought not be promoted everywhere in same way (Davis
and Tilton, 2002).

7

That said, the report goes on to suggest that if compared with other countries in the same region, then
mineral dependent economies performed better than non-mineral economies.
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The convergence (if that is what it is) among these positions is around questions of
context and institutions, and increasingly one senses an “it all depends” tone in much
analysis.8 In particular, whether mineral expansion triggers the resource curse effect
or instead fosters growth is deemed to depend on the quality of institutions: on
whether a fiscal social contract exists or not, on degrees of transparency, and on the
quality of governance in general. Writing from the Bank, Fahr-Weber (2002:14)
conclude that those countries that “get it right” display competent economic, sectoral
and revenue management, and that the challenge of building such institutional
capacity is “more urgent” “where the mining sector dominates an economy.”
Consistent with this focus on institutions Karl (2007: 256) insists that “the ‘resource
curse’ is primarily a political not an economic phenomenon.”9 However, by framing
the issue as a political problem rather than a governance issue, Karl also helps make
explicit that it is precisely in the domain of the political that significant divergence
persists among critics and proponents. This is so in at least two senses: the real
politics of state formation and the realpolitik of mining investment. By the former,
we mean the understanding of how “competent” institutions might emerge. While the
IFIs and others approach such institutional questions as capacity building issues,
historical experience would suggest that the consolidation of democratizing
institutions is more likely to be a product of conflict than technocratic design,
corporate philanthropy or the sorts of public sector management loans that the IFIs are
wont to offer (Bebbington and Burneo, 2008; Boix, 2008). Terry Karl notes the
institutional and political distortions that have emerged in mineral dependent
economies “cannot be undone without a huge coordinated effort by all the
stakeholders involved” (Karl, 2007: 258). Disagreement persists, then, over the
mechanisms through which institutional change occurs (socio-political processes or
IFI loans?), and the time scales over which this happens (historical time or project
time?).10

8

Aspinall (2007) similarly shows that the likelihood of grievance translating into sustained and armed
mobilization depends on deeper regional histories and processes of state formation.
9
While Karl’s empirical reference is to petro-states, though her more general public intellectual work
around revenue transparency addresses mineral states also.
10
In an interview with Bebbington, a senior manager at the Inter-American Development Bank asked
incredulously, so do we just leave it under the ground until the institutions are built? Just maybe, the
answer is yes (Stiglitz, 2007).
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The determination on the part of IFIs, companies and their host governments to
believe that good governance can be crafted in project time is in turn related to the
realpolitik of the sector. This realpolitik is driven by an intense pressure to continue,
indeed expand, investment in extractive industry. Thus, while the multilaterals, the
industry and others may acknowledge in print that “governance matters”, actions
speak louder than publications – and the actions reveal a different story. We comment
on the industries’ actions in the next section - here we focus on those of the IFIs and
thus (by implication) of host governments who sit on IFI boards.

IFI practice suggests that investment is proceeding apace. In the Inter-American
Development Bank the private sector development group is on the ascendant. The
World Bank Group has continued to support programmes that reform investment and
mining codes, ease profit repatriation, reduce and fix tax and royalty rates, and
support basic geological surveying in order to generate more base data on the basis of
which companies can make decisions as to where to invest in more detailed
exploration (Bury, 2005; Campbell, 2003: 4; Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007).
Meanwhile MIGA is involved in large scale mining investments (Szablowski, 2002),
and the IFC already has investments in several very large mines. One of these, the
already mentioned Yanacocha in Peru, is said to be among the most profitable
investments in the entire IFC portfolio. Moreover, some of this investment growth
occurs in contexts where the Banks’ own governance sensitive analysis would suggest
it should not, leading Pegg (2006: 382) to conclude that “the [World] Bank has
refused to make good governance criteria a precondition for its involvement in the
mining sector.” The relatively guarded response of the Bank’s Management to the
quite critical findings of the Extractive Industries Review appears to confirm this
view, and suggests little proclivity to slow-down investment in extractive industry or
increase ex ante conditions (Pegg, 2006). In interviews, IFI staff working in the
sector will argue, almost mantra-like, that even if in-country governance conditions
are not ideal, it is better for the bank in question to be involved in extractive industry
investment because from the inside they will be able to make things better.

Campbell (2003, 2006, 2008) takes this critique further still and argues that the ways
in which the Bank Group has supported mining actually undermine state capacity and
12

weaken potential links between mining and development. Reforms, she says, have
been designed merely to increase investment, and have paid scant attention to themes
such as regional development, mining-agriculture linkages, environmental protection
or social impacts:
“.. reforms have had the effect of reducing institutional capacity, constraining
policy options, as well as driving down norms and standards in areas of critical
importance for social and economic development, and the protection of the
environment” (Campbell, 2008:3).
In short, reforms have weakened the ability of African states to perform precisely
those management, monitoring and surveillance roles that elsewhere the Bank
suggests are essential (Fahr-Weber, 2002).

If the realpolitik of extraction is what really drives the mining-development
relationship, more than any nuanced conceptual argument about the resource curse,
then there is reason to suspect that the patterns identified in the resource curse
literature will persist for some time. This seems all the more so if we look at certain
tendencies in sector practice.

SECTOR PRACTICE AND THE SHIFTING GEOGRAPHIES OF MINING

Over the last two decades, the international mining sector has undergone changes in
its global geographies of investment, ownership and demand, as well as in national
and local geographies of extraction. Not all these shifts imply that patterns identified
in the resource will persist, though many of them have quite ambiguous implications
for the quality of governance in the countries experiencing mineral growth and also
seem likely to foster social protest.

Between 1990 and 2001 mining investment in developing economies showed, in
relative terms, a steady increase while that in developed economies declined (Bridge,
2004a). This appears to be an effect of the types of macroeconomic and sector
reforms just noted, coupled with the push effect of more stringent environmental
standards and concerns in the North (Holden and Jacobson, 2007; Cardiff and Sampat,
2007). Of course, important mining activity has continued in the global North,
especially in Canada, the USA and Australia, and it may well be that global warming,
13

ice melt and policy changes may lead to increased exploration in the Canadian Arctic,
Antarctica and elsewhere. Nonetheless, the increase of investment in developing
countries has been palpable.

This growth into the global South has been geographically uneven, with some regions
– and some countries within those regions - seeing far more growth than others
(Bridge, 2004a; Cardiff and Sampat, 2007). Latin America has seen a steady increase
in its share of global investment from 12 percent in 1990 to fully 33 per cent by 2000
(de Echave, 2007), and during the 1990s it saw twelve of the world’s twenty-five
largest mining investment projects (Bridge (2004a). Investment in mineral
exploration in Africa is also increasing rapidly, from 4% of global spending in 1991 to
17.5% in 1998, and overall mining investment in sub-Saharan Africa doubled between
1990 and 1997 (Pegg, 2006:383). Gold mine production in Ghana increased 700%
over the last two decades (Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007: 101).

There is also somewhat greater geographical unevenness in the domiciles of
companies involved in mineral extraction. By 2006, the Brazilian miner, Companhia
Vale do Rio Doce had “emerged as a full scale, integrated, diversified and successful
global mining giant from a regional iron ore company”, becoming one of the world’s
top four mining companies (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007:29). By 2008, the top 40
companies included five from China, and two from each of Russian, India and
Indonesia (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008:50). Thus one begins to see emerging
market companies increasing their mining investment in Latin America, Africa and
elsewhere (often with support from their home states in deals which combine mining
and development).11 Their presence is also being increasingly felt in investment
markets: news was made in 2007 when for the first time a British company
(Monterrico Metals) listed on London’s Alternative Investment Market and with
significant copper assets in Peru was purchased by a Chinese consortium (Zijin).12

“For instance, the Chinese in January 2008 finalized a deal to provide loans of around $5bn to the
DRC for infrastructure projects in an unconventional exchange for majority stakes in two Congolese
coppercobalt deposits for Chinese firms. Additionally, loans from the Chinese Development Bank
helped finance Chinalco’s purchase of 9% of the Rio Tinto Group” (PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
2008:42).
12
Such changes complicate strategies for activists who have typically targeted companies and financial
institutions based in North America, Europe and Australia.
11
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Geographies of demand for minerals have also shifted with East and South Asia
becoming progressively more important metal consumers. Along with increasing
involvement of hedge funds in commodities and derivatives
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007:49-50), this has pushed mineral prices steadily
upwards since around 2003. Meanwhile, technological innovations in exploration,
production and environmental management have also moved the mineral frontier
outwards, converting once economically uninteresting deposits into viable
propositions. Finally, profit margins have increased. The revenue of the world’s top
40 mining companies increased 2.6 fold between 2002 and 2006, while net profit
increased more than 15-fold by 2007, and 20-fold by 2008 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
2007: 34; 2008: 27).

These changes appear to have shifted risk-return calculations in the sector in ways that
affect decisions about where to invest. In some cases, companies have moved into
environments that, though known to possess important mineral deposits, were
previously considered far too difficult and dangerous to invest in. Changing
technologies of social and territorial control now offer some means for controlling
part of this risk. The increasing consolidation of a global private security industry
provides instruments that companies can use to survey the spaces within which they
need to operate. Indeed, as “new forms of capital investment are intersecting with
new techniques for establishing selective political order” (Ferguson, 2006: 195), so in
Africa “the countries that (in the terms of World Bank and IMF reformers) are the
biggest “failures” have been among the most successful at attracting foreign capital
investment” (ibid: 196), much of which is in extractive industries (albeit more in
hydrocarbons).13 Indeed, Ferguson suggests that such relatively risky contexts can
also be perversely attractive to investment because – to the extent that the direct areas
in which operations occur can be cordoned off from the remainder of the country and
so local risks reduced – they offer environments in which tax manipulations, income
remittances and other practices of extra-legal profit maximization are far easier to
enact (see also Frynas, 1998).

13

Nonetheless Ferguson (2006) speaks of “The oil-like features of new mining ventures.”
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Ferguson’s image of “enclaved mineral-rich patches efficiently exploited by flexible
private firms, with security provided on an “as-needed” basis by specialized
corporations while the elite cliques who are nominal holders of sovereignty certify the
industry’s legality and international legitimacy in exchange for a piece of the action”
(ibid: 204) may lie at one extreme of the relationships between investment,
governance and geography that have emerged in recent rounds of mineral expansion.
However, the differences from processes occurring elsewhere may be more of degree
than kind. In the Andes, mining has moved into areas that have no tradition of mining
but are currently used and occupied by agro-pastoral communities. This expansion
has elicited protests from communities and activists alike. The response of the mining
sector to these protests have made the links between mining, private security and state
forces of violence more apparent. Even in these ostensibly more democratic
environments, activists have been subjected to surveillance and accusations of
terrorism,14 and the coupling of mining and private security accompanies all faces of
the sector: from the security services afforded to executives’ homes, through those
employed by supply companies and onto those guarding mine installations. The more
general point is that the expansion of mining has come coupled with changes in the
way in which security is provided, with the state willingly delegating (or contracting
out) the use of force to private actors (Campbell, 2006). The sector’s expansion thus
becomes an important vector of more profound changes in the relationships between
state, violence and space.

Private security and the blunt instruments that Ferguson notes are not the only means
through which the sector manages protest and risk as it moves into these new
environments. Also important are discursive techniques that distinguish between “old
mining” and “new mining,” a language of dichotomies that casts as “old mining” that
which damaged the environment, had dangerous workplaces, and ignored the needs of
local communities. In contradistinction, the “new mining” is defined as socially and
environmentally responsible, capital intensive, based on skilled labour, and in
possession of technologies that ensure that environmental risk can be managed.
Through these technologies - it is insisted – mining can minimize the environmental
damage it produces, and in some cases even become a vehicle of environmental
14

See for instance http://www.nodirtygold.org/recent_actions.cfm#20041105CQ and
http://www.conflictosmineros.net/al/html/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=643
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protection with the establishment of (conveniently person free) conservation areas
around the mine site.

Beyond the technological and bureaucratic viability of such claims, they are
interesting in other more theoretical senses. They constitute a discourse of ecological
modernization par excellence. The mining sector becomes a vehicle for the more
general argument that environmental risk can be managed, that society should
therefore not be afraid in the face of such risk and that public risks are best managed
privately. The rise of Corporate Social and Environment Responsibility – and the
attendant argument that the best regulation of mining is self-regulation - is also part of
this discourse. This is not to suggest that all CSR is a sham or without content.
However, given its environmental impacts, the industry may well have seen CSR as a
means “to justify their existence” (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006: 272, 271) while still
trying to maintain control of the conditions of this existence. The combination of
arguments about ecological modernization and private management of public risk has
been central to this strategy. As with the link between mining and private security,
the consequences reach well beyond the sector.

These discourses are, though, fragile and the continuing and escalating protests
around mining suggest that many actors remained un-persuaded. One reason for this
may derive from a tension between the image that the larger companies seek to
project, and the ways in which production chains within the sector have come to be
organized. Just as one example, much exploration work is conducted not by the “top
40” corporations but rather by smaller, often barely capitalized companies known as
“juniors” (Bridge, 2004: 220, 240). The very conditions of these companies – their
relative lack of capital, their consequent need to find deposits quickly in order to
recoup costs, and almost by definition their lack of competent community relations
teams – mean that they are far more likely to mishandle community relations, shortcut local decision making processes, and so trigger conflicts (Bebbington et al., 2007).
The problem for the larger companies that then acquire juniors who have been
successful in identifying deposits is that they also acquire the conflictive and difficult
community relations that have been created during the exploration phase.
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As investment has expanded, it has, then, moved into new territories and countries,
some with no history of mining, others with recent histories of significant political
disorder. To ease its entry into these territories, the industry has developed new
linkages with security provision, and has assumed new discourses on risk
management, with governance implications that go well beyond the sector. At the
same time, this expansion has elicited resistance and protest. The geography of
mineral expansion has thus also become one of changing forms of protest and
instability.

CONTESTING EXTRACTION: PATTERNS OF PROTEST

From exploitation to dispossession: changing axes of mining protest?

Mineral extraction has long been accompanied by social protest. Historically, such
protest hinged mostly around the relationship between capital and labour. Though
often supported by political activists, such protest was led largely by union and
worker organizations. Arguments revolved around workplace conditions, the
distribution of surplus and the social relations governing ownership. The scale and
target audiences of such arguments were local and at most national. At times, the
process of organizing around these arguments led to the emergence of national
mineworkers’ unions that became important forces of national political change (as in
Bolivia in the 1950s).
If we consider David Harvey’s distinction between capital accumulation nourished by
exploitation, and capital accumulation through dispossession (Harvey, 2005), these
were protests over relationships of exploitation in which workers sought higher
wages, shorter working days, and shares in profits or ownership. Such protests
certainly continue through to the present and recent rises in mineral prices and
company profits have introduced new vigour into some workers’ organizations
otherwise weakened or disarticulated by neo-liberalization and mine privatization.
However, the shifting and expanding geographies of mineral investment outlined in
previous sections have elicited different forms of protest that articulate a range of
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concerns about environment, human rights, identity, territory, livelihood, and
nationalism.15

These protests differ from workplace struggles in various ways. One relates to the
issues at stake. These struggles are frequently over the meaning of development
rather than simply over the distribution of rent, and the actors involved assume more
hostile positions vis-à-vis mining, arguing that extraction should simply not occur in a
particular place, or even not at all. These can become struggles against development
oriented towards economic growth, and for development as a process that fosters
more inclusive (albeit smaller) economies, respects citizenship rights, demonstrates
environmental integrity, and allows for the co-existence of cultures and localized
forms of territorial governance (c.f. Escobar, 1995).16

Second, while worker protests could be read in terms of theories regarding the
relationships between capital and labour, these more recent forms of protest can be
read in terms of different theoretical arguments. For instance, the reasoning one
might find among ecological economists – that orthodox economic assessments of
extraction exclude many costs and misunderstand the value of nature (MartinezAlier, 2007) - clearly underlies positions assumed by certain environmental groups.
Likewise, positions assumed by more radical environmentalist groups (Acción
Ecológica, 2007) are informed by intellectual arguments regarding natural capital and
the limits beyond which it should not be drawn down. Among organizations that are
not categorically anti-mining but are sceptical of arguments regarding the easy
translation of mining into development, one sees concepts embedded in theories of the
resource curse at work. Here we see groups arguing not against mining per se but
rather insisting that the institutional pre-requisites for avoiding the resource curse are
simply not in place. The Publish What You Pay campaign, and the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative are relevant in this regard, as they address a central
theme in the resource curse literature, namely the lack of transparency in government
management of revenue from mining (Karl, 2007).
Of course, such protests are not confined to this recent phase of global expansion – some readers will
recall the campaigns against Rio Tinto on UK campuses in the 1970s and 1980s. The organization
People Against Rio Tinto and its Subsidiaries was a founder of the Mines and Communities Network
(www.minesandcommunities.org).
16
This is not to romanticize such protests – indeed, less benign political and personal ambitions are
also often at play.
15
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Third, the scales at which protests are pursued have changed. Increasingly, these are
protests that operate simultaneously in the mine affected locality, the national political
sphere, the home bases of companies and investment banks and along the mineral
commodity chain (cf. Tsing, 2004; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Haarstad and Fløysand,
2007). The actors involved have also changed. Alongside local and national
membership organizations, are national and transnational human rights,
environmental and specialist NGOs. Different protests have become articulated either
through pre-existing international networks and alliances, such as those revolving
around Friends of the Earth-International, or through new alliances emerging
specifically to deal with mining issues (see footnote 3). Academics working on these
issues sometimes become part of these articulated networks, and Kirsch has suggested
that the human rights and justice issues raised by mining demand more activist forms
of scholarly engagement (Kirsch, 2006; Bebbington et al., 2007).

Some internationally networked campaigns revolve around emblematic and
particularly egregious cases in which mining is linked to environmental and human
rights abuses. Examples here include well known instances – such as protests against
Freeport McMoRan in Papua – as well as lesser known ones, such as the Majaz/Río
Blanco Copper project in Northern Peru that has articulated groups from Peru,
Belgium, the UK and the US (see www.perusupportgroup.org.uk). Other campaigns
have targeted individual companies (e.g. the International Day of Action Against
Barrick Gold, a global protest day that included simultaneous protests in Argentina,
Chile, Peru, Canada and Australia), while the No Dirty Gold campaign and initiatives
to promote fair trade gold address whole commodity chains.17 Finally are those
campaigns rooted in struggles for indigenous people’s rights and pushing for “free,
prior and informed consent” from indigenous peoples before extractive industry
projects can proceed on their lands. This sheer range of international campaigns
reflects the extent to which mining has become an important area of work for activist
and (increasingly) advocacy oriented development groups such as Friends of the
Earth-International, Oxfam-International, and the Catholic social justice agencies

17

See Hilson (2008), Sarin (2006) and http://www.nodirtygold.org.
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articulated within CIDSE (Coopération Internacional pour le Développement et la
Solidarité).
A fourth difference from workplace oriented mining protests is – to return to Harvey
(2005) – that these newer protests can better be understood as defensive responses to
accumulation through dispossession rather than accumulation by exploitation
(Bebbington et al., forthcoming). The nature of the (real or perceived) dispossession
at stake varies among cases. These have been struggles against dispossession of: land,
territory, landscape and natural resources; property, self-governance, citizenship and
cultural rights; and of the value inherent within the subsoil. In many cases, the rapid
expansion of concessions coupled with favourable tax environments and corporate
super-profits have created a sense of countries being opened up to a profound
dispossession reminiscent of Galeano’s Open Veins of Latin America (1973). These
are then movements about the relationship between capital, society, environment and
development and which strive to build a broader class constituency than was the case
in earlier miners’ movements

Protests around Mining: Epiphenomena or development phenomena?

The question that haunts all these protests is whether they make a difference - whether
they change the course of relationships between mining and development, or whether,
in the final instance, they are mere bit parts in plays scripted by mining companies
and Ministries of Finance and of Energy and Mines. The question is all the more
relevant given the fractures that frequently exist among sub-groups within these
movements – fractures that so often prevent movements from building and sustaining
more integrated narratives on mining and development alternatives (Bebbington et al.,
forthcoming). Here we explore evidence on the impacts (if any) of these movements
at international, national and sub-national levels.

Reframing international debates?

A striking feature of the last decade of mineral expansion is the way in which it has
witnessed both the emergence of inter- and trans-national activism and protest, and
organized discursive changes in the industry. At a global level, the point can be
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illustrated by three examples. In response to rising criticism, parts of the industry
sponsored the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development initiative between 2000
and 2002. Though reformist in tone and criticized by activist groups, the initiative
(MMSD, 2002) nonetheless pushed the industry to engage with issues of
environment, sustainability, indigenous peoples, human rights, and corruption in ways
that had often been glossed over in the past. The Extractive Industries Review (World
Bank, 2004) was also forced by international protest targeted at the negative
consequences of World Bank support to mining and hydrocarbons (Pegg, 2006). This
Review ran over a similar period (2000-2004 with follow up monitoring). While
Bank management did not accept several of the recommendations, the Review
nonetheless forced the institution to engage with issues that up to then had been
largely sidelined. How far this has changed investment practice is an open question,
but it subjected the Bank Group to levels of scrutiny from which it would be difficult
to turn back, and so gives activist points of leverage that previously did not exist.

The third change was the founding in 2001 of the International Council for Mining
and Metals (a sort of “club” of self-styled responsible mining companies). ICMM’s
creation (out of the International Council on Metals and the Environment) had much
to do, however, with an increasingly explicit engagement by a number of companies
with ideas of sustainable development both through MMSD and in preparation for the
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. To join ICMM, companies have to
subscribe to its “sustainable development framework”: ten principles of social and
environmental responsibility, public reporting of performance against these principles
and third party verification. Of course, ICMM is also an instrument for generating
bodies of knowledge that largely favour the industry and so could be viewed as one
more variant of “green-washing” in order to protect market share. Whatever the case,
these commitments once again open levers for influence and define principles against
which ICMM members can be held to account through advocacy and critical
publications (for instance, War on Want, 2007). ICMM has also felt obliged to
engage with arguments about the resource curse (e.g. ICMM, 2006). While the
conclusions they draw explain failures to translate mining into development mostly in
terms of weak government and social institutions rather than a result mineral
expansion per se, they nonetheless recognise that the effects identified by the resource
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curse thesis are sometimes encountered in practice. Indeed, one reading might be that
having recognized that resource curse issues and the social mobilization that can
emerge around them threaten the sustainability of large scale investments,
corporations have become more aware that measures are needed not only to foster
mineral sector growth but also to establish a more solid basis to ensure that this
growth fosters development.
Reframing national debates in Latin America

The more interesting scale at which to consider the articulation between protest,
mobilization and debates on mining and development is the national and here Latin
America presents a range of outcomes. At one extreme are countries such as
Honduras and Guatemala where, even in the presence of protest and activism,
processes of mineral expansion have evolved more or less as industry and sponsoring
embassies and bilateral aid programmes would wish.18 At the opposite extreme are
cases such as Ecuador and Bolivia where activists and movement organizations have
become part of government, and have taken their concerns and agendas with them. In
these instances, the very institutions of government serve to amplify movement
concerns, and open new domains of public debate regarding the very desirability of
mining. Lying between these two extremes are countries like Peru, where protest and
activism clearly shift the contours of public debates on the desirability and
governance of mineral expansion, but where also, in the final instance, little real
change occurs in public policies on the regulation of mining and its relationships to
development.

While each country context has its own specificities, reading across cases suggests
that if movements are to shift public debates in ways that stand any chance of
translating into significant change in the governance of mineral expansion, then this is
far more likely to occur if these movements become part of government. Such a
move requires articulations between activism, social movements, and political parties
(Crabtree, 2008). As debates during 2008 in Ecuador demonstrated, under certain
18

The role of certain embassies and aid programmes in facilitating a neo-liberalized expansion of
mining and of investment by companies of the same nationality, should not be underestimated. The
Canadian embassy has played important roles in Ecuador and Honduras and a group of embassies
worked together in Peru.
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constellations of forces this can lead to situations in which discussions of the resource
curse and of the relationships between mineral expansion, environment and social
conflict go as far as becoming part of the process of writing a new Constitution.
Indeed, there were serious suggestions that the Constitution might ban open cast
mining within Ecuadorian territory, or at least establish constitutional principles that
would significantly limit the potential for mineral expansion. The tensions this caused
between the President of Ecuador and the President of the Constituent Assembly
helped make mining even more an issue of public debate.

Shifting territorial trajectories

The most visceral protests around mining occur in those territories that are directly
affected. It is here that grazing lands are lost, water supplies compromised, jobs most
emotively sought, existing artisanal mining displaced, and the noisy, dusty and
dangerous movements of mining company trucks becomes part of everyday life. In
the face of these differing experiences, and expectations, it is often the case that the
expansion of mining elicits increased levels of conflict within populations. These
conflicts not only pit opponents and proponents against each other, but also emerge as
different groups each seek to reap their own benefits from mineral expansion. Often,
such conflicts are underlain by longer-standing rivalries and differences that mining
serves to amplify. The protest accompanying mining thus influences territorial
dynamics by changing the socio-political atmosphere in ways that weaken a range of
local institutions and produce the institutional preconditions for the resource curse to
work itself out locally (Bebbington et al., 2007).

Protest can lead to changes in corporate practices. Mine level patterns of expansion
may respond to protest, delaying moves into areas that elicit most resistance, and
expanding instead on other fronts. Protest or the anticipation of protest has also led
companies to increase investment in environmental technologies and corporate social
responsibility programmes, even if this is with a view to weakening social
organizations. How far any of these changes occur in practice depends, of course, on
many factors, of which we note two. First, the relative cohesion of protest – in the
presence of fractured and fragile movements, mining companies can be expected to do
far less. Second is the issue of corporate culture and the varying styles and capacities
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that characterize different companies. This is a theme on which little is known,
though it is clear that not all mining companies are the same (Jenkins and Yakovleva,
2006). Smaller scale junior companies operating with shorter term horizons are far
less likely to adapt their practices. Some larger scale companies are also inclined to
do little – think again of La Oroya. But certain larger transnational companies have
shown some inclination to adapt their practices, have recognized that poor reputation
can genuinely weaken their business prospects and have sought to enhance their
contributions to local development by increasing local investment, hiring more labour,
and seeking negotiated settlements (Thorp, 2008).

While ambivalence characterizes the response of many local populations to mining,
there have been some cases of more or less unified opposition and in where such
protest has emerged early on in the exploration phase19 it has occasionally stopped
mining expansion altogether – meaning that territories continue to be primarily
agrarian. Some experiences have involved referenda organized by citizens and local
organizations in order to gauge and project the balance of community opinion
regarding mining. The emblematic cases here are Tambogrande, Huancabamba and
Ayabaca in Piura, Perú; Esquel, Argentina; Cotacachi in Ecuador;, and Sipacapa/San
Marcos, Guatemala (see Haarstad and Fløysand, 2007; Bebbington and Burneo, 2007;
Bebbington et al., forthcoming). Though they are few in number, such cases have
assumed great political and symbolic value in the world of activism, because they
offer evidence that mining can be stopped.20

The significance of such cases goes beyond the particular territories in which they
have occurred, for reasons that go to the heart of the relationships between neoliberalization and democracy. These are cases in which populations have argued that
they should be able to determine the broad contours of development in their territories
and that their majority view should carry more weight than do the private property
rights of mining corporations or the policy preferences of central ministries committed
to growth models based on market reforms and foreign direct investment. In doing so
they challenge government (and corporations) to take a position on where the balance
19

Once the mine is in operation, protest negotiates the forms that mining will take, not whether or not it
will continue.
20
They have also had knock on effects on legislation elsewhere. Following the Esquel referendum,
other Argentine provinces have made legislation on mining more restrictive.
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ought to lie between central government preferences, private investor rights and local
participatory democracy in determining territorial trajectories. That said, local
referenda can only go so far because the control and allocation of property rights in
the subsoil typically resides with central ministries – to amend this system of property
would require legal and constitutional changes that local protest alone cannot
deliver.21

Such protests draw attention to the chronically (and deliberately) weak regulation of
the mining sector, and the absence of any spatial and ecologically informed planning
of extractive industry development. And while they have sometimes induced
government responses that tend towards the authoritarian (Bebbington and Burneo,
2008), there are also signs that they may induce parallel responses from government
that open up space for a more rational regulation of the sector. The arguments around
Ecuador’s Constitution reflected this possibility. The ultimate working out of debates
such as these will mark the ways in which – in the mining sector – the lines are drawn
between neo-liberalization, state reform and democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

To the extent that the economies of China, India and elsewhere continue to grow at or
around current rates, demand for minerals and building materials (and hydrocarbons)
will likewise grow. This will drive further geographical expansion of mining
activities with an increasing number of companies based in China, India, Brazil and
Russia becoming global players. This scenario raises questions for policy, research
and theory, and in this final section we focus on several of those that we consider
most important and urgent.

First, consider some of the environmental challenges that mineral expansion will
bring. Almost by definition this growth will take mining into new territories.
Experience in Latin America is that these new territories tend to be ones of particular
ecological vulnerability (e.g. see WRI, 2003). We see large scale projects being
21

Indeed, such a regime for allocating property rights increases the likelihood that protest will become
violent because it reduces what can be changed through ordinary political processes. Our thanks to one
of our reviewers for this observation.
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proposed for headwater areas of drainage basins and in glacial areas. We also see
projects proposed for lower grade deposits, requiring the removal of proportionally
more rock and the use of more water to for the same amount of mineral. In contexts of
rapid deglaciation where careful water management becomes ever more important for
sustainable development, this expansion will drive conflict over an increasingly
contested resource.22 While mining companies insist that their water use is highly
efficient, communities and activists remain unconvinced and hydrologists tell us that
the effects of removing large parts of rock in headwater areas can have non-linear,
negative effects on water availability downstream.23 Here is a whole agenda for
research at the interface of the political economy of development and hydrology that
has the potential not only to address practical and policy challenges, but also to
understand new ways in which social forms of nature are being produced (Castree and
Braun, 2001). There are also a series of connections to be explored between mining
expansion, private and public management of risk and processes of ecological
modernization.

These transformations also demand more work on the emergence and consequences of
social movements - a more familiar terrain for political ecology. Mineral expansion
will continue to drive new forms of social conflict much of which is likely to be
related precisely to these pressures on water resources. This is so not only because
water is of tangible importance to livelihoods but also because concerns around secure
access to good quality water are likely to favour articulations across a wider
geographical spectrum (between rural and urban actors along the course of the
hydrological system), and also across a wider political spectrum (between both radical
and reformist actors) than can concerns around rural land ownership, indigeneity,
sovereignty or the abuses of transnational corporations which tend only to speak to
particular sub-groups.

There are many research themes that need to be pursued here. For the movements
themselves, one of the most vital regards the conditions under which, and strategies
through which, they are able to institutionalize their objective. For development
22

In more humid environments, water issues are distinct. To the extent that climate change elicits more
high magnitude rainfall events, tailings management will become more challenging, with greater
possibility of contaminated runoff and tailings collapse.
23
Mark Williams, University of Colorado, personal communication, October 2006.
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theory, perhaps the most important questions relate to the relationships among
movement, nature and political economy. This interplay is an acutely geographical
process. Not only do its outcomes produce different types of environment-society
relationship, but these relationships also vary across national and international space.
These variations across space are themselves inter-related, parts of wider capital
flows, forms of regulation, and transnational activist, technocratic and professional
networks. Of course, the mining sector is hardly the only case of such global
processes – an ever expanding body of work on commodity chains explores similar
relationships in other sectors. Yet there is perhaps something special and specific
about the mineral sector in that it generates much more, and more complex, forms of
social protest than do most other commodity chains. As such it provides a particularly
fruitful means for thinking about the ways in which political economy and
mobilization are co-produced and at the same time produce particular geographies of
development.

Third, these processes afford an interesting context in which to explore state
formation and democracy under neo- and post neo-liberalization. The minerals sector
has seen pro-investment institutional reforms that have dramatically and deliberately
reduced the capacity of the state to govern. Reforms have typically produced regimes
in which royalty payments are low, in which ministries responsible for promoting
mining are also responsible for regulating its environmental impacts, in which
privatized relationships play an increased role in the administration of force and
security, and in which instruments for planning mineral expansion in terms of
environmental vulnerabilities and existing livelihoods have been weakened or
terminated.24 The relationship between such regulatory instruments and social protest
can flow in both directions. An absence of regulation can trigger protests when
mining moves into sensitive areas that a more “rational” and participatory planning
process might have deemed inappropriate. On the other hand, the political pressure
exercised through protest may be a sine qua non for pro-poor and inclusive regulatory
institutions to emerge in the first place. The intensity of conflict in the mining sector
allows one to explore how far protest might induce state institutions favouring a more
24

One of the most extreme cases was Ecuador, where until April 2008 the law was such that when a
company or person requests a mining concession from the state, the state had to grant it. Once given,
the concession could be renewed every thirty years in perpetuity. These rules meant that, in practice,
the Ecuadorian state was unable – legally – to govern the geography of mining expansion.
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socially and environmentally rational regulation of the sector as well as a more
equitable distribution of the value produced by mining.

This brings us back to where this paper began: the resource curse. For while the
literature may have demonstrated that the resource curse is not inherent to mineral
expansion, there is also plenty of evidence to suggest that the realpolitik of the sector
continues to sustain practices that neither facilitate an escape from the resource curse,
nor allow governance challenges to be addressed prior to further mineral expansion.
In such a context, it should be of no surprise that the sector continues to be so
conflictive. In this context, the analytical challenge is to understand how far and in
what ways this protest and activism might contribute to building pathways out of the
resource curse, and help avert what could all too easily become an extractive free for
all with serious repercussions for environment, society and state formation.

It would be an interesting exercise, ten to fifteen years from now, to ask how many of
the sites in which readers of Development and Change do their work have become
influenced in one way or another by the mining economy. Indeed, how many of us
know whether the areas in which we do our work have already had their mineral
rights concessioned to third parties? Our ability to anticipate possible futures might
be enhanced if we did.
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